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STEPHEN E. MOORE AND RALPH E. DUERRE 
A. BANKING LAW 
§6.1. Massachusetts motor vehicle certificate of title law. A title 
certificate statute was enacted on September 9, 1971 with an effec-
tive date of September 1, 1972.1 The new law requires all owners 
of vehicles which are not exempted under the statute to apply for title 
certificates.2 The statute does not immediately apply to vehicles properly 
registered as of September 1, 1972, but those vehicles will also require 
certificates upon ( 1) the purchase of the vehicle from a dealer in the 
Commonwealth or any other transfer of ownership; (2) creation of a 
security interest in the vehicle after the effective date of the statute; (3) 
notification of the owner by a lienholder whose security interest was not 
perfected as of September 1, 1972 that the lienholder wants to perfect 
his security interest; or (4) September 1, 1974.3 
The law is important to banking institutions and other secured parties 
because it provides the sole method for perfecting a security interest in a 
motor vehicle for which a certificate of title has been issued on or after 
September 1, 1972.4 Such a security interest is perfected by the delivery 
to the registrar of (1) any existing document of title, including, for 
example, a pre-existing title certificate or a notarized bill of sale; (2) 
an application for a certificate of title (Fonn RMV-l) containing the 
name and address of the lienholder, and the date and type of the security 
agreement; and (3) the required fee.5 The security interest is perfected 
from the time of its creation if delivery is completed within ten days 
thereafter, and otherwise it is perfected at the time of delivery.6 Vehicles 
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§6.1. 1 Acts of 1971, c. 754, adding G.L., c. 90D. 
2 G.L., c. 90D, §4. Exempt vehicles are listed in G.L., c. 90D, §2, and include 
vehicles owned by the United States, vehicles owned by dearers or manufacturers 
and held for sale including "demonstrator" models, vehicles owned by non-
residents and not required by law to be registered, and vehicles regularly engaged 
in interstate transportation of persons or property for which a certificate of title 
has been issued in another state. 
S G.L., c. 90D, §§34 and 35. 
4 G.L., c. 90D, §26. 
5 G.L., c. 90D, §21. 
6 Id. 
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brought into Massachusetts under security interests validly perfected 
under the law of another jurisdiction require title certificates, and the 
security interest remains perfected for four months after the issuance of 
the certificate and also thereafter if, within the four month period, 
the interest is perfected in Massachusetts.7 Upon issuance of a certificate 
of title the registrar is required to mail the certificate to the first lien-
holder noted thereon and, if none, to the owner.8 
Section 23 governs notice requirements in the event that a lienholder 
assigns his security interest to a third party. Where the assignee does not 
take the actions necessary to be named on the certificate as the lienholder, 
third persons may deal with the assignor without liability to the assignee 
and the assignor remains liable for any obligations as lienholder. The 
new section may also restrict the continued perfected status of a security 
interest which has been assigned to a third party who is not named on 
the certificate as lienholder to a limited group (i.e., creditors of and 
transferees from the owner only, but query whether trustees in bank-
ruptcy or transferees from persons other than the owner would be bound) . 
It is recommended, therefore, that assignees take the necessary steps to 
be named on the certificate as lienholder. 
Section 24 of the Act requires, upon satisfaction of the security interest, 
that the lienholder execute a release of his security interest within 10 
days after demand by the debtor or, in any event, within 30 days after 
satisfaction. The release is to be noted on the space provided in the 
certificate of title or on a form approved by the registrar. In a normal 
situation the secured party will be able to meet these requirements easily 
as it will have possession of the certificate of title which would have been 
delivered to it by the registrar. 
§6.2. Massachusetts Fair Credit Reporting Act: Differences from 
federal law. On September 22, 1971 Massachusetts adopted a state 
Fair Credit Reporting Act.1 The state law corresponds in almost all 
respects to the Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act which was adopted in 
1970.2 The following differences appear to be of importance: (1) Section 
51 (3)( e), describing circumstances under which a consumer reporting 
agency may furnish a consumer report, deletes the federal language 
which permitted such a report if the person requesting it had "a legiti-
mate business need for the information in connection with a business 
transaction involving the consumer,"3 and substitutes therefor language 
which permits a consumer report if the person using the report "intends 
to use the information in connection with a transaction either entered 
into or being negotiated with a consumer, if by the terms of the trans-
action either party transfers an interest in real or personal property, pays 
7 Id. 
8 G.L., c. 90D, §I1. 
§6.2. 1 Acts of 1971, c. 805, adding G.L., c. 93, §§50-68. 
2 15 U.S.C. §§1681 et seq. (1970). 
3 15 U.S.C. §1681b(3)(E) (1970). 
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money or renders selVices, or becomes obligated so to transfer property, 
pay money or render selVices." (2) Section 62(a) requires the user of a 
consumer report to advise the consumer of the name and address of 
the consumer reporting agency furnishing the report if the report is the 
basis of a denial or termination of consumer credit, insurance or em-
ployment. The federal law requires disclosure of the name and address 
only if consumer credit, insurance or employment is denied or the charge 
therefore is increased:+ The state law, therefore, expands the requirement 
of· disclosure to include termination as well as denial. (3) Section 65 
provides for jurisdiction in any court of competent jurisdiction. The 
federal law provides for jurisdiction of the appropriate United States 
District Court in addition to any other, court of competent jurisdiction. 
(4) Section 68, for which there is no equivalent in the federal law, 
provides that failure to comply with the provisions of the state law shall 
constitute an unfair trade practice under the provisions of Chapter 93A, 
Section 2 (a). 
The state Fair Credit Reporting Act became effective December 21, 
1971. 
§6.3. Sex discrimination in granting mortgage loans. Section 4 (3B) 
of Chapter 151B was amended on October 13, 19711 (effective January 
11, 1972) by establishing as an unlawful practice the discrimination 
against any person in the granting of any mortgage loan (including but 
not limited to discrimination in the interest rate, terms or duration of 
such mortgage loan) by reason of sex. Previously the discrimination 
prohibition had been limited to race, color, religious creed, national 
origin or ancestry. This restriction applies to any person engaged in the 
business of granting mortgage loans. 
§6.4. Protection of consumers against careless and erroneous billings. 
Massachusetts adopted an act concerning erroneous billings which be-
came effective January 5, 1972.1 A consumer who receives a statement 
of account in connection with an extension of credit may give written 
notice to the creditor of any errors in the statement. Under the statute 
the creditor is required to send a written acknowledgment of the con-
sumer's notice within 14 days of receipt of the notice and within 60 
days of receipt of the notice to make corrections and notify the consumer 
thereof or notify the consumer in writing as to his reasons for belief that 
the account was correct. The 60-dayperiod can be extended within cer-
tain time limits in the event ,that the creditor requests additional in-
formation from the consumer or from a third party in conformance with 
the statute, but in no event shall the period he extended beyond 120 
days.2 
4 Id. U681m(a). 
16.3. 1 Acts of 1971, c. 874, 12. 
16.4. 1 Acts of 1971, c. 860, 11, adding G.L., Co 930. 
2 G.L., c. 930, 13. 
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A creditor who, upon receipt of a notice from a consumer relating 
to an alleged billing error, fails to comply with the requirements stated 
above (1) forfeits his right to collect any finance charge or other charge 
imposed by the creditor in connection with the amount which the cus-
tomer alleges to be in error; (2) if such amount is in fact in error, is 
liable to the consumer for actual damages or a sum to be awarded by a 
court of not less than $100 nor more than $300; and (3) in the case 
of a successful action to enforce liability, is liaJble for the costs of the 
action together with attorneys' fees.3 
In addition to the required responses, a creditor upon the opening of 
an account and not less than quarterly during each year must provide 
the customer with a written notice explaining certain requirements of 
the Act, including the requirements of notice and the time periods in 
which the adjustments must be made.4 Failure to comply with the Act 
constitutes an unfair or deceptive act or practice under the provisions 
of Chapter 93A, Section 2 (a).5 Although the Act is not entirely clear, it 
appears to relate to any consumer credit transaction where periodic 
billing is the practice, such as revolving credit arrangements, credit card 
programs and home mortgage transactions where the creditor sends 
monthly statements to the consumer. 
§6.5. Prohibition against serving as a director or officer of more 
than one banking institution. Effective January 1, 1975, a trustee, di-
rector or other officer of a savings bank, cooperative bank or trust 
company may at the same time be a trustee, director or other officer 
of another savings bank, cooperative bank, trust company, state or 
federally chartered savings and loan association or national banking 
association only if there is in force a permit therefor issued by the Com-
missioner of Banks in writing with the reasons stated thereon as to why 
the public interest warrants the issuance of the permit.1 Such permit 
is to be issued after hearing only if the Commissioner finds that it is not 
incompatible with the public interest for the permit to issue. 
§6.6. Issuance of credit cards by savings banks. Effective Septem-
ber 5, 1972, savings banks are authorized to issue and honor credit cards 
for the purpose of making loans to one or more peTSons.1 The impact 
on the banking industry of the increase in competition between savings 
and commercial banks resulting from this legislation and from the de-
velopment of NOW accounts is discussed below at §6.11. 
§6. 7. Trustee process legislation. Prior to the decision of the three 
judge federal court in Schneide.r v. Margossian which is discussed below 
3 G.L., c. 930, 14. 
4 G.L., c. 930, 15. 
5 G.L., c. 930, §6. 
16.5. 1 Acts of 1972, c. 520, amending G.L., c. 168, 110, c. 170, §8A, and 
c. 172, §I6. 
16.6. 1 Acts of 1972, c. 381, adding G.L., c. 168, §37B. 
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in this SURVEY,1 Massachusetts adopted legislation relating to trustee pro-
cess. Section 20 in Chapter 246 of the General Laws was amended,2 
with respect to the exemption for moneys of the defendant deposited in 
any account designated as a payroll account, to provide penalties for 
depositing funds in a payroll account with the intent to evade attach-
ment by trustee process. The penalties include a fine of not less than $100 
nor more than $1,000 or imprisonment in the house of correction for 
not more than three months. A corporate president or treasurer making 
such deposits with the proscribed intent is subject to the penalties es-
tablished by the Act. Section 28 of Chapter 246 was also amended3 
to increase the exemption for wages for personal labor or services to 
$125 per week and the exemption for pensions payable to the defendant 
to $100 per week. The increased exemptions became effective January 
1, 1973 and apply to only actions commenced on or after that date. 
Section 28A was added to Chapter 2464 and it exempts from attachment 
by trustee process $500 of any natural person deposited in any account 
or accounts in a trust company, savings bank, cooperative bank, credit 
union, national banking association or any other banking institution. 
The exemption does not include deposits of businesses, trusts or organiza-
tions, and no natural person is entitled to more than one $500 exemption 
at anytime. If the plaintiff determines that the defendant has been the 
beneficiary of more than one exemption, the plaintiff may apply to the 
court for further attachments.5 
§6.8. Late charges in mortgage transactions. Chapter 412 of the 
Acts of 19721 was approved on June 8, 1972 and became effective 
September 6, 1972. This legislation provides that no mortgagee, assignee 
or holder of a mortgage note secured by a first lien on a dwelling house 
of four or less separate households and occupied or to be occupied in 
whole or in part by the mortgagor shall require the mortgagor to pay 
a penalty or late charge for any payment made within 15 days from 
the due date of such payment and, in the event a late charge shall be 
properly assessable, such late charge may not exceed 3 percent of the 
amount of principal and interest overdue. The legislation applies only 
to contracts entered into on or after September 6, 1972. 
§6.9. Residential mortgages: Certification of title. 1 This legislation 
was adopted on June 29, 1972 and became effective on September 27, 
1972. With respect to a mortgage loan on real estate improved with a 
dwelling designed to be occupied by not more than four families and 
occupied or to be occupied in whole or in part by the mortgagor, when-
16.7. 1 See §6.13, infra. 
2 Acts of 1972, c. 392. 
3 Acts of 1972, c. 174, § 1. 
4 Acts of 1972, c. 801. 
5 For further discussion of trustee process legislation see §l0.5. 
§6.8. 1 Adding G.L., c. 183, 159. 
16.9. 1 Acts of 1972, c. 547, 11, adding G.L;, c. 93, 170. 
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ever the mortgagor is required or agrees to be responsible for attorneys' 
fees and expenses charged by an attorney acting on behalf of the mort-
gagee, the mortgagor or his attorney must be given a copy of any 
certification of title to the mortgaged property and such certification 
shall be deemed to have been rendered for the benefit of the mortgagor 
to the same extent as it was for the mortgagee. This legislation does not 
apply to mortgages subject to the provisions of Sections 90A through 
90E of Chapter 140. Failure to comply with this statute constitutes an 
unfair or deceptive act or practice under the provisions of Chapter 93A. 
In connection with the adoption of Chapter 93, Section 70, Section 17B 
of Chapter 184 was revised to eliminate inconsistent language.2 
§6.1O. Other statutory developments. 
1. Maximum finance .charges for open end credit transactions.1 New 
legislation (effective July 1, 1973) establishes maximum interest rates 
with respect to open end credit plans. The interest rates are limited to 
1 ~ percent per month on so much of the outstanding unpaid balance 
as does not exceed $500 and 1 percent per month on balances over $500. 
If the total amount of any finance charges for any 12-month period is 
less than $6, no more than $6 may be assessed during that period. 
General Laws, Chapter 14OC, Section 6B provides that a finance oharge 
imposed with respect to transactions involving the sale of retail goods 
or services pursuant to an open end credit plan shall be computed on 
either the average daily balance or on the previous balance after all 
payments, returns or other credits have been deducted. Additionally, 
payments must be credited to the debtor's account not more than two 
days after receipt thereof. The same restrictions apply to retail instalment 
sales and services transactions which are governed by Chapter 255D. 
2. Amendments to truth-in-lending law. Several amendments were 
made to Chapter 140C (truth-in-Iending) by Chapter 229 of the Acts of 
1972. These amendments were designed to bring Chapter 140C into 
compliance with Regulation Z of the Governors of the Federal Reserve 
Board.2 
3. Group insumnce for employees of banks.3 This legislation was ap-
proved on March 23, 1972 to become effective June 21, 1972, and 
permits savings banks, cooperative banks and credit unions to provide 
group life, accident and health, medical, surgical and/or hospital in-
surance for their employees, officers and directors. 
4. Savings banks-Trustee of retirement plans.4 Legislation was 
adopted on March 23, 1972 to be effective June 21, 1972 permitting 
2 Acts of 1972, c. 547, §2. For a more detailed discussion of Chapter 547 of 
the Acts of 1972 see §9.1 infra. 
§6.10. 1 Acts of 1972, c. 783, amending G.L., c. 140, §114B, c. HOC, §6B, 
and c. 255D, §27. 
2 For further discussion see §§ 10.4-10.5. 
3 Acts of 1972, c. 110, amending G.L., c. 167, §57. 
4 Acts of 1972, c. 116, adding G.L., c. 168, §66B. 
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savings banks to act as trustees of retirement plans under the "Self-
Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962." 
5. Cooperative Banks-Increase in time for first payment on con-
struction loans.5 This legislation was adopted on February 17, 1972 to 
be effective May 17, 1972, and permits a cooperative bank to make con-
struction mortgage loans provided that payments on account of principal 
or interest shall commence not later than 24 months from the date of 
the mortgage note. Prior law required payments to commence not later 
than 12 months from the date of the mortgage note. 
6. Elimination of notice requirement upon executor or administrator 
of a decedent who maintained an account with a cooperative bank, savings 
bank or trust company.6 Effective October 11, 1972, the requirement 
of notice for withdrawals from certain time accounts (essentially 90-day 
notice accounts) held with cooperative banks, savings banks and trust 
companies has been eliminated for the executor or administrator of the 
estate of a deceased depositor. 
7. General. Amendments were made to Chapters 168, 170 and 172 
of the General Laws (1) to permit savings banks, cooperative banks and 
trust companies to increase the amount which they may invest in banking 
premises;7 (2) to provide for mortgage loans not exceeding 95 percent 
of the value of the real estate with respect to certain dwellings which 
are occupied in whole or in part by the mortgagor;8 (3) to permit trust 
companies to make second mortgage loans on real estate provided that 
such second mortgages are not the primary security and provided further 
that such second mortgages may be taken on residential property only 
as collateral for a business or commercial loan;9 and (4) to increase 
the maximum amount of deposits to $40,000 in the case of an individual 
account and $80,000 in the case of joint accounts.1D 
§6.11. Savings banks: Negotiable orders of withdrawal. In Con-
sumers Savings Bank v. Commissioner of Banks,l the plaintiff filed a bill 
in equity seeking a declaration that it had authority to arrange for the 
transfer of funds from savings accounts by negotiable orders of with-
drawal without requiring the depositor or his representative to appear at 
the offices of the bank. The plaintiff had devised a plan whereby a savings 
account depositor could withdraw funds by means of a negotiable order 
5 Acts of 1972, c. 27, amending G.L., c. 170, §23. 
6 Acts of 1972, c. 711, amending G.L., c. 167, §48B. 
7 Acts of 1972, c. 94, amending G.L., c. 168, §53; Acts of 1972, c. 345 amend-
ing G.L., c. 170, §30; and Acts of 1971, c. 316 amending G.L., c. 172, §30. 
8 Acts of 1972, c. 315 adding G.L., c. 170 §24(3B) and Acts of 1972, c. 336, 
adding G.L., 168, §35 (6B). 
9 Acts of 1972, c. 437, adding G.L., c. 172, §48A. 
ID Acts of 1972, c. 84, amending G.L., c. 168, §21. 
§6.11. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 929, 282 N.E.2d 416. For a more extensive 
treatment of this decision and the policy issues it raises, the reader is referred 
to Comment, The Negotiable Order of Withdrawal (NOW) Account: "Checking 
Accounts" for Savings Banks? 14 B.C. Ind. &: Com. L. Rev. 471 (1973). 
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of withdrawal. The negotiable order of withdrawal was simply a draft 
to be drawn by the depositor on the savings bank as drawee, payable 
through a commercial bank with which the savings bank maintained 
an account. Depositors incur a small service charge for each draft issued, 
the standard fee apparently being 15 cents per draft. 
The plaintiff had sought approval for its so-called NOW account 
from the Commissioner of Banks for Massachusetts but on September 
28, 1970 the Commissioner denied the request for approval. At trial 
the Commissioner relied upon certain sections of Chapter 168 of the 
Massachusetts General Laws to support her contention that negotiable 
orders of withdrawal are not permitted as a device for the withdrawal 
of funds from a savings account. The Court held that Chapter 168 did 
not spell out the mechanics of withdrawal and, therefore, did not 
proscribe the plan. The Court reasoned that Section 26 of Chapter 168 
permitted withdrawals "at such time and such manner as the by-laws 
[of the bank] direct" and, therefore, "leaves the establishment of methods 
of withdrawal to the individual banks."2 The Commissioner further 
argued that all savings accounts require passbooks. However, Section 1 
of Chapter 168 requires only a "book or other instrument issued to the 
depositor as evidence of his deposit." Because of the rather curious state-
ment that a "negotiable order of withdrawal qualifies as an 'other instru-
ment' evidencing deposit," it appears that the Court read Section 1 as 
requiring only a memorandum of deposit such as a typical deposit slip.3 
As was said in Savings Bank v. Bank Commr. of Maryland, 248 Md. 
461, 475, "If ... a depositor of the Bank, on making a withdrawal, 
has the option of requesting cash, or a treasurer's check, or of pur-
chasing a money order, ... according him a fourth option of drawing 
a check on his own account ... is a distinction without a difference." 
That language is most persuasive and helpful in the determination of 
this case.4 
Commercial banks are prohibited from offering this type of withdrawal 
device by Section 217.5 ( c) of Regulation Q of the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System; cooperative banks are similarly prohibited 
under Section 13 of Chapter 170 which requires passbooks; and federal 
savings and loan associations are prohibited from honoring this type of 
withdrawal device by 12 U.S.C. § 1464(b) (1) and 12 C.F.R. § 434.4-1. 
The introduction of NOW accounts by Massachusetts savings banks 
coupled with the adoption of legislation authorizing such savings banks 
to issue credit cards may disturb the delicate competitive equilibrium 
between the various types of banking institutions doing business within 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Savings banks in Massachusetts 
currently have assets well in excess of $15 billion which exceeds sub-
2 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 930, 282 N.E.2d at 417. 
11 Id. at 931, 282 N.E.2d at 417. 
4 Id. 
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stantially the combined assets of commercial banks (national banks and 
trust companies) . Any significant shift of deposits from commercial banks, 
cooperative banks and credit unions to savings banks could have po-
tentially serious consequences to the banking industry and the public in 
general.s Savings banks, as noted above, are the only type of banking 
institution which is permitted to offer a savings account from which 
deposits may be withdrawn by negotiable orders of withdrawal. Savings 
banks thus have been afforded a competitive edge which is not available 
to other types of banking institutions. As a result, the savings bank has 
become for some customers a preferable "one-stop" banking institution 
where a customer can take advantage of a credit card revolving loan 
account and a regular savings account which pays 51'4 percent interest 
and has all of the practical features of a demand checking account.6 
Cooperative banks and credit unions are at a competitive disadvantage 
because such institutions cannot establish a savings account from which 
deposits may be withdrawn by negotiable orders of withdrawal. Com-
mercial banks are at a similar disadvantage because they cannot pay 
interest on demand deposits;? they can pay only 4Y2 percent interest on 
regular savings accounts;8 and they must maintain "reserves" against 
demand deposits.9 The concept of reserves was introduced in the De-
pression years as a safety factor to insure that a bank would be able to 
honor withdrawal demand from highly volatile demand deposit accounts. 
The lack of a reserve requirement in connection with NOW accounts is 
inconsistent with one of the fundamental principles of the Banking Act 
of 1933 and raises questions of public safety. 
Although the current banking structure has developed over a number 
of years, there has been demand for readjustment in the recent past. As 
a result of such demands, a President's Commission on Financial Structure 
and Regulation was organized and the Massachusetts legislature also 
created a special commission to study the matter in detail. The Presi-
dent's Commission on Financial Structure and Regulation recently issued 
a report commonly known as the "Hunt Report" which recommended 
changes, but which noted that the changes should be considered as a 
whole and that the piecemeal adoption of any specific recommendations 
5 It shouM be noted,. however, that NOW accounts are only available to 
individuals. Accordingly, corporate or business checking accounts will remain in 
commercial banks. 
6 Under state law NOW accounts are not classified as demand accounts be-
cause savings banks can require up to 90 days notice before withdrawal from a 
regular savings account. However, because this power has infrequently, if ever, 
been used by a savings bank, the NOW account is for all practical purposes 
similar to a demand account. 
7 Section 217.2(a) of Regulation Q of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System. 
SId. §217.7(c). 
9 G.L., c. 172, §27 requires Massachusetts trust companies to maintain 15% 
or 20% of the trust company's demand and time deposits that are withdrawable 
within 30 days. 
9
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might create new competitive disturbances. In the introduction of the 
report the commission stated that its recommendations 
... are interrelated and the Commission urges that they be con-
sidered as a package, even though some Df the propDsed changes, if 
enacted separately, would improve the financial system. The Com-
mission believes that piecemeal adoption of the recommendations 
raises the danger of creating new and greater imbalances.1O 
While many of the recommendations of the Hunt Report are desirable, 
including permitting thrift institutions to Dffer demand deposits, the 
isolated adoption of legislation authorizing savings banks to issue credit 
cards and a judicial decision permitting NOW accounts are not the re-
sult of an integrated, systematic approach to readjustment within the 
banking industry and have, therefore, created serious public policy 
questions. 
§6.12. Constitutionality of repossession and replevin: Fuentes v. 
Shevin.1 Although not arising from a Massachusetts case, the United 
States Supreme Court's decision in Fuentes v. Shevin, has had consider-
able effect on Massachusetts banking institutions with respect to replevin 
and repossession of persDnal property purchased and/or financed on 
credit. In Fuentes, the debtors sDught declaratory and injunctive relief 
against continued enforcement of state replevin statutes (Florida and 
Pennsylvania) Dn the ground that the procedures established by the 
replevin statutes violated the 14th Amendment's guarantee that no state 
shall deprive a person of property without due process Df law. The 
Florida replevin statute permitted a creditDr to apply to a state court 
for the issuance of a writ of replevin which when issued directed a sheriff 
to seize prDperty in possession Df the defendant and to hDld the same 
pursuant to the statute for satisfaction of any judgment which the creditor 
might obtain in the actiDn. The Pennsylvania replevin statute differed 
somewhat in its procedural requirements, but the differences were not 
of an essential nature. Under both statutes the defendant was not en-
titled to notice of the proceeding whereby the writ was issued and had 
nO' opportunity to challenge the issuance of the writ. As stated by the 
Court, "The issue is whether procedural due process in the context of 
these cases requires an opportunity for a hearing before the State authD-
rizes its agents to seize property in the pDssession of a person upon the 
applicatiDn of another."2 The Court reviewed various arguments of the 
creditDr and held that the failure of the replevin statutes to provide for 
notice and a prior hearing constituted the deprivation of an interest 
protected by the 14th Amendment. The Court rejected the creditor's 
argument that the 14th Amendment only applies to' property in which 
10 The Report of the President's Commission on Financial Structure and Regu-
lation 9 (1971). 
§6.12. 1 407 U.S. 67 (1972). 
2 Id. at 80. 
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the debtor had title, stating that the Amendment protects "any significant 
property interest" including the right of possession.3 The Court also 
noted that the deprivation need not be permanent as the 14th Amend-
ment protects temporary, nonfinal deprivations of property. Further, the 
Court rejected the creditor's arguments that the 14th Amendment pro-
tects only goods which are "absolute necessities of life" and that replevin 
procedures are necessary to protect important governmental or general 
public interests. 
There was a dissent from Justice White who was joined by Chief 
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun. Justice White pointed out that the 
creditor had an interest in preserving the collateral, an interest which 
overrode the minimal deprivation occasioned upon the debtor. Justice 
White also noted the long-standing traditional use of replevin by creditors 
in almost all states and stated that this decision could be negated by 
simple contractural provisions which permitted the creditor to repossess 
upon default without legal action. 
Many in the public press, and in fact some in legal circles, read Fuentes 
as prohibiting any kind of repossession unless procedures were established 
for notice to the debtor and an opportunity to be heard. It must be 
remembered, however, that the prohibition of the 14th Amendment runs 
only against state action which deprives persons of property without due 
process. It would appear, therefore, that Fuentes does not extend to the 
situation where a creditor invokes self-help repossession, that is, where 
the creditor, pursuant to the terms of the security agreement, merely 
exercises his right to repossess the property in question without the aid 
of any state instrumentality, such as a court or sheriff. Such is the position 
put forward by Justice White in his dissent. The issue of the constitution-
ality of self-help repossession has been before several federal district 
courts recently and has been upheld in almost all instances.4 
A review of the Massachusetts replevin statute (Chapter 247 of the 
Massachusetts General Laws) fails to disclose procedures for notice to 
the defendant and an opportunity for the defendant to be heard before 
issuance of the writ of replevin. It would appear, therefore, that the 
Massachusetts statute would not pass constitutional muster in view of 
the holding in Fuentes. 
§6.13. Constitutionality of trustee process: Schneider v. Margossian.1 
This case involved another attack upon traditional creditors' remedies 
on the basis that the remedy (attachment by trustee process) was 
3 Id. at 86-87. 
4 See, e.g. McCormick v. First Nat'l Bank, 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971). 
But see Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Ca1. 1972) where the court 
struck down self-help repossession on 14th Amendment grounds. The Adams case 
is currently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
In Massachusetts, a creditor's right to repossession under G.L., c. 106, §9-503 
was enforced without discussion of constitutional questions in Still Associates, Inc. 
v. Murphy, 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 245, 247, 267 N.E.2d 217, 219. 
§6.13. 1 349 F. Supp. 741 (D. Mass. 1972). 
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violative of procedural due process under the 14th Amendment. The 
debtors sought declaratory and injunctive relief from the continued 
enforcement of Chapter 246 of the Massachusetts General Laws insofar 
as it denied defendants in civil actions notice and an opportunity to be 
heard prior to attachments of their property. Following the rationale of 
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.2 and the Fuentes decision, the court 
held that the Massachusetts trustee process statute violated the 14th 
Amendment because it lacked any procedures designed to give the de-
fendant notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the attachment 
of his property. 
The court, however, stated that its decision had prospective effect 
only (except for the cases before it) and that, therefore, the decision 
had no effect upon actions started prior to September 22, 1972. Ad-
ditionally, the court ruled that state courts could continue to charge 
trustees with respect to amounts held upon attachments made prior 
to September 22, 1972. The decision striking trustee process generally 
was inevitable in view of the Sniadach and Fuentes decisions. However, 
that portion of the opinion which gives the decision prospective effect 
only appears certain to be challenged. 
In a Supplemental Memorandum and Order, dated October 26, 1972, 
the court clarified its prior decision and noted that Chapter 246 was 
struck down only insofar as it denies defendants in civil actions notice 
and an opportunity to be heard prior to the making of attachments of 
their property by way of trustee process. The court specifically stated 
that Chapter 246 was not found to be unconstitutional in its entirety 
and noted, for example, that Chapter 246, Section 32 (Eighth) permitting 
wage attachments upon a judgment appeared to have procedures which 
would pass constitutional muster. 
Consistent with recent attacks on traditional creditors remedies under 
the due process clause, it should be noted ,that the Federal District 
Court of Massachusetts now has a case before it attacking the con-
stitutionality of real estate attachments.3 
§6.14. Authority of national banks to provide travel agency services. 
Arnold ,Tours, Inc. v. Campi was an action brought by 42 travel agencies 
against the Comptroller of the Currency and a national bank for declara-
tory and injunctive relief with respect to a ruling of the Comptroller 
authorizing national hanks to engage in the travel agency business. The 
action has a considerable history including two considerations by the 
United States Supreme Court.2 In its present posture the trial judge 
was acting upon the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and the 
defendants' motions for summary judgment. 
2395 U.S. 337 (1969). 
3 Aberman Realty Bldg. Corp. v. Smith, Civil No. 72-2516 (D. Mass., filed 
Aug. 11, 1972). 
16.14. I 338 F. Supp. 721 (D. Mass. 1972). 
2 397 U.S. 315 (1970); and 400 U.S. 45 (1970). 
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The National Bank Act provides that a national banking association 
shall have the power to exercise all such incidental powers as shall be 
necessary to carry on the business of banking.3 In 1963 the Comptroller 
issued regulations which purported to grant to a national bank carte 
blanche to undertake the complete operation of a travel agency on the 
grounds that such services were incidental to their banking services. The 
Court noted that the 1963 regulation represented a radical departure 
from past administrative rulings and held that the Comptroller did, in 
fact, exceed his statutory authority when he issued the regulations autho-
rizing national banks to provide travel agency services. 
The court noted that national banks provided services which were re-
lated to travel, such as the sale of travelers checks and the making of 
travel loans, but concluded that the operation of a travel agency was not 
incidental to its banking powers. Further, the Court held that there was 
no genuine issue of material fact and accordingly granted the plaintiffs' 
motion for summary judgment. The court entered an order declaring 
that the Comptroller's regulation (12 C.F.R. 7.1) was invalid as being 
in excess of his statutory powers and that the national bank in question 
must divest itself of its travel agency service within six months from the 
date of filing of the order and that said bank be thereafter permanently 
enjoined from engaging in the travel agency business. 
B. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
The following discussion is intended to analyze those cases of the 
Supreme Judicial Court which significantly clarify or develop the law 
of Massachusetts with respect to the Uniform Commercial Code. 
§6.15. Contracts for the sale of securities: Statute of Frauds. 
Colt v. Fradkin l involved an application of Section 8-319 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code2 to an option to purchase securities at a specified price 
and for a specified period. The option was contained in each of two oral 
3 12 U.S.C. §24(7th). 
§6.1S. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 607, 281 N.E.2d 213. 
2 G.L., c. 106, §8-319 provides as follows: "A contract for the sale of securities 
is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless 
(a) there is some writing signed by the party against whom enforcement is 
sought or by his authorized agent or broker sufficient to indicate that a contract 
has been made for sale of a stated quantity of described securities at a defined 
or stated price; or 
(b) delivery of the security has been accepted or payment has been made but 
the contract is enforceable under this provision only to the extent of such delivery 
or payment; or 
(c) within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the sale or purchase 
and sufficient against the sender under paragraph (a) has been received by the 
party against whom enforcement is sought and he has failed to send written 
objection to its contents within ten days .after its receipt; or . 
(d) the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his pleading, 
testimony or otherwise in court that a contract was made for sale of a stated 
quantity of described securities at a defined or stated price." 
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agreements between the plaintiff, a New York stockbroker, and the de-
fendants, William and Irving Fradkin. The terms of the agreements were 
determined by a master: 
[O]n July 26, 1967, the parties entered into an oral agreement by 
telephone conversation, wherein [each of] the defendants agreed to 
purchase 40,000 shares of unregistered stock [of Logic Corporation 
(Logic)] at 5¢ per share and the plaintiff would have the option to 
purchase 20,000 shares from the defendant, William Fradkin and 
20,000 from the defendant, Irving Fradkin by paying to each of them 
$1,000.00 at any time within 2 years from the issuance of said stock. 
It was further agreed that in the event that the Logic stock proved 
worthless and the defendants suffered any loss, the plaintiff agreed 
to pay to the defendants jointly, one-third of such loss, thereby 
participating equally in any such loss.3 
The plaintiff confirmed the above oral agreement by letter to each of 
the defendants later that same day and enclosed an "'investment letter' 
and a subscription form," both of which were executed by the defendants 
and sent to Logic's lawyers. The plaintiff arranged for issuance of the 
shares and on August 8, 1967 the shares were duly issued to the de-
fendants. On April 1, 1968 plaintiff exercised his options (pursuant to 
the parties' oral agreements) by sending each of the defendants a letter 
with a $1,000 check enclosed. Each of the defendants returned the check 
and refused to turn over 20,000 shares. The plaintiff then brought this 
suit for specific performance of the oral agreement, and the defendants 
pleaded the statute of frauds as a defense. 
UCC §8-319 provides a special statute of frauds which applies to a 
"contract for the sale of securities," and the first issue was whether the 
ultimate transaction would qualify as a sale. "Sale" is defined in VCC 
§2-106 as "the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price." 
Although both sides argued that §8-319 properly applied, the Court 
took pains to emphasize that "[t]he fact that plaintiffs had an option to 
buy or not to buy did not negate the existence of a contract for sale by 
the defendants."4 (Emphasis added). The Court cited Mortimer B. 
Burnside & Co., Inc. v. Havener Securities Corp.'5 where a New York 
court enforced an oral agreement "to assign to plaintiff one third of the 
25,000 common stock purchase warrants issued to defendant ... by 
Ormont Drug & Chemical Co., Inc., in the event plaintiff purchased 
Ormont stock from one Friedman." The Burnside court specifically de-
cided that the transfer was made for a price: 
The answer to that question is furnished by section 2-304 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code which states that "The price can be 
3 Record at 15. 
+ 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 611, 281 N.E.2d at 217. 
'5 25 App. Div. 2d 373, 269 N.Y.S.2d 724 (1966). 
14
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1972 [1972], Art. 9
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1972/iss1/9
134 1972 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §6.15 
made payable in money or otherwise." The word "otherwise" is not 
limited in any way and therefore it could include any consideration 
sufficient to support a contract. The purchase of the stock from 
Friedman, at defendants' request, constituted the consideration for 
the agreement to transfer the warrants.6 
Reasoning by analogy to VCC Article 2 (as the New York appellate 
division did in Burnside) the Supreme Judicial Court in Fradkin deter-
mined that "contract for sale" would include a contract for a future 
sale of securities at the buyer's option, even when the consideration con-
sisted of a promise (1) to arrange for the issuance of 80,000 unregistered 
shares of Logic Corporation and, (2) in the event such stock becomes 
worthless, to share in one-third of the loss.7 The Court expressly declined 
to follow the much discredited case of Cohn, Ivers & Co. v. Gross8 
which held that a contract granting a "call" option was not a contract 
for the sale of securities under VCC §8-319 but a contract for the sale 
of general intangibles under VCC §1-206: 
That holding might be appropriate in a case where the holder of an 
outstanding option made a contract to sell it, but it does not properly 
apply to a case where the owner or prospective owner of securities 
contracts to sell them at the buyer's option.9 
Whether the option itself would have been a "contract for the sale of 
securities" if there had been no consideration was not discussed. It is 
settled law that an option is not a contract for sale but rather an 
offer which may not be revoked for a specified period of time.10 How-
ever, that question may be purely academic since an "option contract," 
in addition to being rare in practice, would be unenforceable not only 
because of possible violations of the statute of frauds but also because 
of a lack of consideration.11 
Having found the transaction to be a contract for the sale of securities 
within the meaning of vec §8-319, the Court undertook to determine 
whether the conditions imposed under paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) 12 
of that section had been satisfied. Plaintiff first argued that VCC 
§8-319(b) had been satisfied when the defendants received and accepted 
80,000 unregistered shares of Logic and the plaintiff agreed to share 
6 25 App. Div. 2d at 375, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 726. 
7 "We agree with the New York court that we may look by analogy to U2-106 
and 2-304 of the Uniform Commercial Code, applicablle to the sale of goods, for 
definitions of 'sale' and 'price.''' 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 611, 281 N.E.2d at 217. 
8 56 Misc. 2d 491, 289 N.Y.S.2d 301 (1968). 
9 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 611, 281 N.E.2d at 217 citing 3 WilHer & Hart, 
UCC Reporter Digest, 18-319, A4 which states: "[als it reads, Section 8-319 
would include call options which are contracts for the sale of securities." 
10 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 161A (3rd ed. 1957); CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 
§§259 et seq. (1963). 
11 CORBIN supra, note 10 at 1263. 
12 See note 2 supra. 
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one-third of any loss in the event of worthlessness. The Court rejected 
this argument, reasoning that the original sale of 80,000 shares was a 
separate transaction from the return sale of 40,000 shares which was 
contemplated in the agreement.13 For purposes of the latter sale, no 
security had been delivered or accepted. Nevertheless, plaintiff had paid 
the 5¢ per share option price, and the Court held that to be sufficient 
for satisfaction of subsection (b). 
The Court then turned to VCC §8-319(a) and found that it too had 
been satisfied. The plaintiff's letters of July 26, 1967 with enclosures 
were "'sufficient to indicate that a contract has been made for sale' by 
the defendants to the plaintiff 'of a stated quantity of described securities 
at a defined or stated price' " and the signature requirement was satisfied 
by the defendants' signing of the subscription forms and investment letters. 
The two separate sales were treated as a single transaction: "[t]he three 
documents, enclosed in the same envelope, must be read as a single 
instrument in light of all the circumstances. So read, they satisfy the 
statute."14 This analysis is consistent with the parties' agreement which 
included the defendants' promises to purchase 80,000 shares of Logic 
and a separate option to purchase 40,000 shares of Logic at any time 
within two years from the date of issuance. However, it is inconsistent 
with the Court's earlier distinction between the sale of 80,000 shares and 
the "return" sale of such shares. The distinction, therefore, is not only 
unnecessary, but also confusing when read in light of the Court's analysis 
of the present transaction and VCC §8-319. 
In its analysis under paragraph (c) the Court followed its previous 
interpretation of the term "sale" to include sales taking place at a future 
time at the buyer's option. Plaintiff's letter of July 26, 1972 was "'a 
writing in confirmation of the sale which was sufficient against the sender 
under paragraph (a);'" it was received " 'within a reasonable time;'" 
and the defendants "'failed to send written objection to its contents 
within ten days after its receipt.' "15 
The defendants finally argued that "[t]he attempted exercise of an 
option on April 1, 1968 [when plaintiff sent to each defendant a letter 
with a $1,000 check enclosed in an attempt to purchase a total of 40,000 
shares of Logic] was the first time a duty to repudiate arose under section 
8-319(c) ."16 
This argument requires that "confirmation of the sale or purchase" be 
interpreted as contemplating only present sales and purchases. However, 
13 "We think, however, that we may look to §2-326(4), which indicates that 
the sale to the plaintiff is to be treated as a separate contract for sale within the 
statute of frauds from the sale to the defendants." 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 611-12, 
281 N.E.2d at 217. 
14 Id. It should be noted that neither petitioner nor respondents argued in 
their briefs that the provisions of paragraph (a) had been satisfied. See Petitioner's 
Brief at 13-17, Respondents' Brief at 7. 
15 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 612-13, 281 N.E.2d at 218. 
16 Respondents' Brief 7. 
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the Court for the third time resorted to Article 2 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code to construe paragraph (c) as applying to a writing in 
confirmation of the contract for a sale or a purchase, regardless of 
whether such sale or purchase is to presently take place or take place 
at a future time. 
§6.16. Forged indorsements. Gordon v. State Street Bank and ,Trust 
Companyl involved the question of whether a drawer of a check may 
recover against a drawee bank for accepting a forged indorsement if 
the intended payee received the funds. According to the report of evi-
dence, it was the drawer's policy to obtain a borrower's wife's signature 
in making loans, but in this case the drawer "intended that the money 
was to be for only [the borrower]." Upon learning that the borrower's 
wife never indorsed a check made jointly payable to the borrower and 
his wife, the drawer sued the drawee bank to recover the face amount 
of the check paid on the forged indorsement of the borrower's wife.2 
The Court adopted, for the first time in Massachusetts, the pre-Code 
rule3 that a drawee bank is not liable for payment on a forged indorse-
ment where the proceeds of the check are received by the person intended 
to receive them.4 Alternatively, the Court suggested that the same result 
might be obtained by application of UCC §3-405 (1) which provides that 
"[a]n indorsement by any person in the name of a named payee is effective 
if ... (b) a person signing as or on behalf of a maker or drawer intends 
the payee to have no interest in the instrument .... " 
There are three possible reasons why the Court hesitated to base 
its decision entirely on Section 3-405. First the court was uncertain 
whether the section applied to the facts in Gordon: 
[T]he language of subsec. 1 (b) may be applicable to the present 
situation. Although so to apply subsec. 1 (b) goes somewhat beyond 
the examples stated in comment 3 (see Uniform Commercial Code, 
1962 Official Text pp. 291-294) to §3-405, one of the underlying 
purposes (of placing the risk of loss from a wrongful indorsement 
on the drawer where his intended payee received the funds) is as 
applicable to this situation as it is to those stated in the examples.5 
Secondly, even if the facts in Gordon were within the purview of VCC 
§3-405 (1) (b), the Court was uncertain as to what kind of interest must 
be lacking in the payee to make the forged indorsement effective: 
If it be considered that Gordon's expectation of her indorsement 
gave her some minimal "interest in the instrument," then the case 
§6.16. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 409, 280 N.E.2d 152. 
2 See G.L., c. 106, §3-419(1) (c). 
3 See G.L., c. 106, § 1-103. 
4 See authorities cited at 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 412, 280 N.E.2d at 155. 
5 Id. at 411, 280 N.E.2d at 154. 
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may not be covered by the Uniform Commercial Code at all.6 (Em-
phasis added). 
Thirdly, the Court may have wanted to clarify the law of Massachusetts 
as to a bank's liability where "[t]he drawer is not damaged ... for no 
person not intended by him to take an interest has done so as a con-
sequence of the forged indorsement [of the check].'" 
§6.17. Bill of lading as evidence of condition of merchandise: Plasti-
leather Corporation v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company.! The de-
fendant insured the plaintiff's merchandise "against the perils of 
transportation" from point A to point B. A shipper issued a "clean" bill 
of lading at point A, reciting that the merchandise was "wrapped en-
tirely in burlap covering" and "in apparent good order and condition;" 
the goods arrived at point B in a damaged condition. Plaintiff had the 
burden of proving that the damage occurred in transit between points 
A and B. He argued that the description contained in the bill of lading 
created a presumption that the merchandise was in good order and 
condition at point A, and that this presumption made out a prima facie 
case. 
The Court followed the well settled rule that a "bill of lading [with 
the recital of "apparent good order and condition"] is prima facie evi-
dence as to external conditions only."2 (Emphasis added). This rule is 
to be distinguished from section 1-202 which does not apply to the con-
dition of the merchandise but rather merely to "the facts stated in the 
[bill of lading] .... " 
§6.18. Prospective profits as an element of damages. Matsushita 
Electric Corporation u. Sonus Corporation l is an instructive application 
to complex facts of UCC provisions regarding (1) formation of a con-
tract arising out of "a course of negotiations,2 (2) late delivery of goods 
specified under a contract as constituting a breach of such contract, and 
justification for such late delivery,3 (3) justification for withholding pay-
ment for an incomplete delivery,4 (4) breach of express warranty and 
reasonable notice of such breach,5 and (5) damages attributed to the 
6 Id. at 412, 280 N.E.2d at 155. The Court does state that "[o]n the evidence 
the judge was warranted in finding that ... [the drawer] intended ... [the 
borrower] alone to receive the proceeds of the check and that he did receive 
them." Id. at 411, 280 N.E.2d at 154. 
, Id. at 411-12, 280 N.E.2d at 154. 
§6.17. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 507, 280 N.E.2d 402. 
2 See authorities cited at 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 509-10, 280 N.E.2d at 404. 
§6.18. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1345, 284 N.E.2d 880. 
2 See G.L., c. 106, §§2-102, 2-105(1) and (2), 2-202, 2-204, 2-205, 2-206, 
2-207. 
3 Id. §§2-301, 2-705(1). 
4 Id. §2-507(l) •. 
5 Id. §§2-313(1) (b) and (c), 2-607(3) (a). 
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several breaches of contract.6 An anal}'llis of those aspects of the case 
would not be useful in this chapter. However, the case deserves further 
mention for one novel element in its decision. The Massachusetts doc-
trine that loss of prospective profits is a recoverable element of damages7 
is incorporated into the provisions of vac §1-l06(1) which provides 
that "[t]he remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered 
to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as 
if the other party had fully performed . . . ." 
6 Id. §l1-106, 2-714, 2-715(2). 
7 See Rombola v. Cosindas, 351 Mass. 382,385,220 N.E.2d 919, 922 (1966). 
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